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  I use two administrative databases combining information about workers’ 
characteristics and earnings to estimate the effect of outplacement services on 
wage prospects of unemployed workers. The results suggest that the impact of 
outplacement is positive, although the magnitude depends on the type of service 
and gender. On one side, the group with the best results is constituted by men 
who receive individual outplacement, increasing their average annual gross wage 
by around 42%. On the other side, women who receive group outplacement 
show small results, whose figures are near 17%. 
 
Keywords: outplacement, wages, unemployed workers, (non-parametric) 
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Resumen 
  Se utilizan dos bases de datos administrativas que combinan información 
sobre las características de los trabajadores y sus ingresos para estimar el efecto 
de los servicios de recolocación en las perspectivas salariales de los trabajadores 
desempleados. Los resultados sugieren que el impacto de la recolocación es 
positivo, aunque la magnitud depende del tipo de servicio y del género del 
trabajador. Por un lado, el grupo con los mejores resultados está constituido por 
hombres que reciben el servicio de recolocación individual, aumentando en 
media su salario bruto anual cerca del 42%. Por otro lado, las mujeres que 
reciben el servicio de recolocación grupal muestran resultados pequeños, con un 
incremento cercano al 17%. 
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  31.  Introduction 
  One of the most significant sides in the definition of quality of work is the 
flexibility and security in the job. Both researchers and policymakers recognize that 
displaced workers experience costly unemployment spells in terms of duration and 
earning losses. The term “flexicurity” focuses on transitions to the workplace, support 
for those who lose their jobs or are seeking alternative and geographical mobility. The 
changes in wage the workers experience in job transition constitute an important 
measure of the level of flexicurity in the labour markets. 
The conclusions of the mainstream politicians’ agenda such as in the 2000 
Lisbon European Council point out that the new strategic objective depends mainly on 
the private sector and public-private partnership. One of the most promising 
relationships between private and public sectors in labour markets is provided by the 
outplacement services. 
The aim of the paper is to analyse the effect of the outplacement services 
provided by the private sector on the wage prospects of unemployed workers. To 
develop the picture, I create an unusual data set by merging administrative records 
covering workers’ earnings with details on the employees and their firms. The resulting 
data set contains information on personal characteristics of the unemployed workers 
who received help from one of the most important outplacement firms in Spain, Creade, 
and workers who belong to the 2002 Wage Structure Survey from the National 
Statistical Office (INE). 
To my knowledge, most analysis of outplacement services since the 1980’s has 
been focused on entrepreneurial topics. The most recent research which follows and 
goes into this branch in depth is threefold. First, there are studies which describe 
particular application of outplacement services (e.g. Estache et al., 2000). A second 
option consists of papers whose aim is related to business and human resources theory, 
such as Challenger (2005). Other researchers mixed both prior branches, such as 
Kobayashi (2004), and Martin and Lekan (2008). Finally, there are studies which go 
beyond and also examine samples of workers who receive outplacement services using 
statistical techniques (e.g. Westaby, 2004).  
The (applied) economic literature related to outplacement services focuses on 
different features of earnings and labour-market position during involuntary job 
disruptions, such as Jacobson et al. (1993), Ruhm (1994) and Ichino et al. (2007). All 
these earning losses may be reduced or limited by the use of outplacement services. 
  4The research mentioned above does not provide much guidance to policymakers 
and others as to the magnitude and persistence of the unemployed workers’ welfare 
involved in outplacement services. To answer such questions requires empirical work 
like that presented in this paper. 
The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, I combine both ways of analysis 
(entrepreneurial and economic points of view) and go further with the assessment of 
outplacement services on reemployment criteria. Second, I provide information on one 
of the most innovative Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) implemented by the 
private sector in the last years, jointly with training programmes. I show partial 
evidence of the reality of these programmes in regulated labour markets, as occurs in 
Spain. Third, I analyse the monetary effect of this measure on unemployed workers, so 
the causal inference analysis may be supplemented by cost-benefit implications of the 
service, which is usually discarded in policy evaluations.  
The main findings of the paper are briefly summarized as follows. I find that 
workers who receive outplacement services get jobs with higher earnings. However, 
each type of service is appointed to different professional levels, and the estimates are 
higher in the case of individual outplacement than group outplacement. The earnings 
also exhibit greater variability by gender. My estimates suggest that the growth 
represents between 17% and 26% of the average annual wage for women, depending on 
the outplacement service received. In the case of men, these figures rise to 28% and 
42% for group and individual outplacement, respectively. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background on 
outplacement services and reviews for the literature of post-displacement earnings and 
outplacement processes. In Section 3, I describe databases and comment on their 
strengths and shortcomings. Section 4 presents the econometric structure and robustness 
comments for estimating the effect of outplacement. In Section 5, I show estimates and 
some concluding remarks follow in Section 6. 
2.  Job disruption, earnings and outplacement 
There is a loss arising from the social value the worker spends to find a job. The 
cost depends on search behaviour determined by the characteristics of the previous jobs 
and the use of help in the transition. The resources devoted to the passive labour market 
measures may be reallocated to set up institutions which become reality the provision of 
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workers in the job transition process.  
As Kobayashi (2004) points out, many workers have little idea about how 
outplacement firms work in the job transitions and usually get mixed outplacement 
services up with private job placement services. Hortal (1999) defines outplacement as 
“the set of services provided by a consultant to the firm (client) and the professional 
(candidate) when they negotiate the rupture of the contractual relationship (…) in order 
to facilitate consultancy and support to assure the continuation of the professional's 
career.” 
From a theoretical point of view, both the firm and the professional can enjoy 
several advantages of outplacement services, besides generating positive effects for 
policy-makers. The negative influence of firing on the relationship between the rest of 
employees and the firm is mitigated, motivation and productivity are maintained and the 
firm’s image improves. The worker who leaves the firm will get help to be ready for a 
new labour stage. Public Sector obtains a cost reduction from working population's loss, 
especially for the case of early retirements. However, the use of outplacement services 
may be observed as a “bad signal” -lack of opportunities and low ability of the worker-, 
and they raise the reservation wage increasing the unemployment duration and public 
benefit spending. There is no argument to support which mechanism prevails. 
The outplacement constitutes an interesting example of partnership between 
private firms and public sector in the field of the ALMPs. As occurs with other ALMPs, 
the evaluation of outplacement services depends on micro databases available. These 
services have belonged to the unobserved part to assess the effect of pre-notifications on 
wages in subsequent employment. Taking into account the comments of Ruhm (1994) 
about displacement, the pre-notifications of plan closings may be accompanied by 
assistance efforts of the firm that raise post-displacement earnings, such as the 
outplacement services. 
The firm that dismisses the professional usually pays the cost of the programme. 
This expenditure is not related to the dismissal compensation of the worker. The 
outplacement firms move between the client and the candidate, knowing the restrictions 
of each party. They cannot guarantee the candidate a new job. If the programme 
concludes and the candidate does not have found a job, the contact between the worker 
and the outplacement firm does not get lost, since the prestige of the firm will be clearly 
committed. The failure may take place, but only a small percentage of candidates gives 
up the methodology before achieving the goal. 
  6According to De Ramos and Hernández (2000), the programme is applied to a 
professional (individual outplacement), the candidate’s spouse, or a set of workers. In 
the latter option, the workers usually belong to similar organization levels and economic 
areas, and the service is defined as group outplacement. 
The basic causes of individual outplacement are related to personal motivations, 
as inadequacy to the position or irreconcilable differences. The reasons in favour of 
group outplacement are not only associated to economic difficulties of the firms, but 
mergers, takeovers and strategic plans of the firms. Hence, group outplacement implies 
a bigger activity and complexity than individual outplacement does. The firm that 
finances the programme has the initiative to choose the type of service. The candidate's 
influence is bigger in the individual case, since the service constitutes a soft and 
conventional solution between both parties. 
Individual outplacement is designed to managers. They hold further financial 
resources and time does not represent an important restriction to examine the available 
options. Nevertheless, the supply of similar jobs to the last one is smaller and age plays 
an outstanding role to intensify the job search. Group outplacement is associated to sets 
of workers in the medium-low level of firms, who make redundant for reorganization 
reasons. Time is a key factor, not only for financial reasons but the labour supply is 
wider. 
A great part of the literature on labour market has focused on job displacement 
and the subsequent effects on workers’ welfare (Jacobson et al., 1993; Eliason and 
Storrie, 2006; Ichino et al., 2007). Although earnings are not the unique measure to 
analyse social costs of displacement process (Hamermesh, 1987), the short-term costs in 
terms of forgone earnings, loss of firm- and industry-specific human capital (measured 
by the tenure with the employer) and other productivity factors have been analysed 
more profoundly than long-term effects. Neal (1995) focuses on the importance of 
industry-specific knowledge to get a new job for unemployed workers and analyses the 
consequences of specific skills and tenure in terms of post-displacement earnings. 
Ruhm (1994) analyses the causal effect of advanced notice on post-displacement 
earnings. However, Ruhm cannot distinguish the pre-notification from other adjustment 
assistance such as outplacement services, so the policy implications of the results 
become complicated. 
This literature has considered outplacement marginally, in part due to the lack of 
detailed information. Research on outplacement services has greatly analysed the 
managerial and entrepreneurial point of view, studying the difficulties of employees to 
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outplacement services, and providing new details to improve the matching between 
labour demand and supply. Estache et al. (2000) describe the labour redundancy in the 
Brazilian Federal Railway prior to privatization in order to be competitive. Challenger 
(2005) justifies the use of (high-quality) outplacement programmes and measures the 
cost reduction derived from using these services. Kobayashi (2004) describes the 
situation of outplacement in Japan and explains with several examples how the workers 
face up to job transitions and the importance of their attitudes and relationship with the 
outplacement firm to get the goal. Martin and Lekan (2008) point out the risk of 
providing standard services that do not address circumstances of the displaced 
executive. They emphasize the significance of adjusting service delivery to the 
particular needs describing cases. Feldman and Leana (2000) show the problems and 
difficulties of downsized executives who search a job due to the existence of 
underemployment and assistance of the firing firm not only in terms of outplacement 
services that should take into account in layoffs. Westaby (2004) uses a sample of 
managers and executives to assess the outplacement services on employment and 
earnings perspectives. He carries out a variance-covariance analysis and evidences that 
outplacement facilitates high-level professionals the return to employment situation. 
Apart from these sets of references, Arellano (2007) provides an overview of the main 
characteristics of outplacement and assess the effect of these services on employment 
perspectives, comparing a group of unemployed workers with outplacement services 
with a control group not receiving the programme.  
3.  Data 
The sample used to analyse the effect of outplacement on wages is created from 
two different databases. The data collection strategy leads to combine flow sampling for 
the outplacement group and stock sampling for the comparison group. With respect to 
the former group, the workers who receive outplacement services come from the 
database of the firm Creade.  
Creade is one of the most important outplacement consultant companies in Spain 
joint with Lee Hecht Harrison, MOA Groupe BIS, Right Management Consultants and 
Uniconsult. They are related to international professional service firms which helped 
almost 7,000 professional from 800 firms to get a job in 2003. Creade is integrated in 
the Human Resources firm Adecco Enterprise. 
  8The database of Creade shows information on the candidates in the outplacement 
programmes, covering sociodemographics (age, gender, education level, language 
skills, way of getting the new job); outplacement process (location of the office in 
charge of the worker, beginning date and ending date of the process, type of 
outplacement programme); and labour market conditions (wage, economic sector and 
position of the previous job and the new job, reasons for job search and seniority at the 
firm) between 1999 and 2003. 
This group is compared to the workers included in the 2002 Wage Structure 
Survey (WSS), created by the INE. The WSS is a four yearly statistical operation (based 
on 2002 survey results) carried out in the framework of the European Union (EU) with 
common methodology and content criteria. The aim of the WSS is to obtain comparable 
results on the structure and distribution of wages among its member states. The survey 
investigates the distribution of wages based on a large variety of variables such as 
gender, occupation, branch of activity, seniority, type of contract and company size. 
Three surveys of this type have been done in Spain, in 1995, 2002 and 2006. The WSS 
belongs to a type of databases that the INE does not provide standardised files of 
individual data for confidentiality reasons, but depending on the study that the 
researcher wishes to conduct, customised anonymity may be requested.  
The selection criteria depend on the characteristics of the Creade database. I 
consider workers in the WSS that are geographically close to those in the Creade 
database. In this particular case, I consider Andalusia, Aragon, Catalonia, Galicia, 
Madrid, Valencian Community, and Basque Country by regions. The rest of regions are 
aggregated in one group. 
I reduce the size of the firm to three intervals (from 10 to 49 workers, from 50 to 
199 workers, and 200 or more workers), following the Commission Recommendation 
2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-
sized enterprises in terms of the number of employees. The reduction process also 
affects the collective agreement (by sector, geographic and the rest of options) and the 
scope of market (local, national, and international market). 
The sample with complete information is composed by 404 workers who receive 
outplacement services (233 workers received group outplacement and 171 workers were 
included in individual outplacement) and 16,565 workplaces and 152,200 workers in the 
WSS, which represent above 75% and nearly 71% of the total number of workplaces 
and workers, respectively. 
  9These administrative databases have several advantages over data used in other 
studies. First, I have detailed information of a set of workers who receive outplacement. 
The private outplacement firms are very reluctant to give databases of their clients. 
Second, I use annual wage as outcome variable because it is available in both samples. 
Third, the size of the comparison group is very high in terms of observations, so the 
costs of creating a set of workers similar to the outplacement group are limited. Finally, 
the scope of the samples represents at least a great part of Spain, because the regions 
included in the databases are the most populous. Following information of the INE, 
these regions represent above seventy percent of the total population of Spain in 2002. 
Of course, there are also disadvantages associated to these data. Although the 
firm Creade is one of the most important outplacement firms in Spain, lack of data from 
other outplacement firms prevents me from a more general analysis. Another 
disadvantage is the small size of the outplacement group. However, this fact is positive 
for the evaluation framework I adopt, because outplacement participation does not 
affect the outcome of non-participants.  
The data collection strategy depends on information about earnings. There is a 
combination of flow sampling from the Creade database and stock sampling from the 
WSS. The period studied between 1999 and 2003 is relatively stable in terms of 
economic growth, so the potential bias due to the macroeconomic context is not 
relevant. The use of this stock sampling is the unique available solution to get a 
sufficiently large number of comparison units with information on earnings. The 
differences in terms of information between both samples should not affect seriously the 
analysis of the case. 
Obtaining information on wages is a very sensitive and difficult task question. 
The difficulties established by institutional setting and the complexity of the definition 
have prevented the use of this variable in Spain. Although the information on wages in 
the databases comes from the worker, and many of them in the Creade database do not 
provide the information on the new job, the variable represents the best option available. 
Finally, there is only information up to the end of the job search, so only short 
run effects are analysed. The time limit may be a serious problem in the context of 
displacement effects on earnings (Jacobson et al., 1993). However, these services are 
focused only on the transition from unemployment to employment, so the potential long 
run effects should not represent the main argument for the measure. 
  10Even given the data limitations, I am able to provide a substantially more 
complete assessment of the determinants of earning losses than it has previously been 
possible. 
I use several sub-samples in order to get success in constructing the best 
comparison group with almost identical characteristics to the outplacement group and 
minimize the shortcomings previously commented. Dropping these observations is 
other step in the process of getting a common support between the outplacement and 
comparison group. The selection criterion is twofold, elimination of individuals with 
non-compatible characteristics and selection by the Bayesian approach. 
For the former case, a more restrictive version of the WSS is achieved by the use 
of information on the workplace and the worker. I do not consider people in workplaces 
outside the regions commented above, owned by the public sector, with fewer than two 
hundred workers or whose target market is small (local or regional market).  
I also eliminate the workers who belong to economic activities and professional 
areas not included in the Creade database, such as agriculture, fishing and forestry, 
public administration, defence, Social Security, private households and extra-territorial 
organizations. Moreover, the workers who get a fixed-contract or a part-time job do not 
usually take part in the outplacement processes, so they are also excluded. This 
restriction eliminates the potential bias derived from the existence of several levels of 
risk aversion among workers in terms of job security. The selection in professional 
status and contract type eliminate individuals whose earnings are very different from the 
annual wage provided by the WSS, following the spirit of Bound and Krueger (1991) to 
avoid high measurement error in earnings data. 
Also workers with low education level are eliminated from the sample because 
individuals in the Creade database have some kind of education. As Eliason and Storrie 
(2006) suggest, the transition from / to temporary employment is more sensitive to 
changes in economic cycle. The own characteristics of the WSS prevent the existence of 
self-employed workers, because the sample only includes workers in firms whose staff 
is constituted by more than 10 employees. Finally, the INE database is composed by 
20,032 workers. Despite the difficulty in matching the data sets and the imposed sample 
restrictions, the process is necessary to get a matched comparison group. 
Taking into account available information, other homogeneity process takes 
place, calculating a new set of probabilities and modifying initial probabilities. The 
study of individual characteristics conditional on belonging to the treatment group 
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services. 
Let   be a combination of observable characteristics for a worker, and let D be 
the event of interest (the binary variable indicating outplacement status). D happens 
under any hypothesis  , where 
k A
k A k AA ∈  countable, disjoint class of events with positive 
probability. Using Bayes’ theorem, the probability of having a combination of 
characteristics given that the worker belongs to the outplacement group is: 














The inference of elements of Bayes’ rule comes from the complete information 
sample. The denominator represents the proportion of workers who receive 
outplacement service in the sample. The probability of the combinations (or prior 
probability) is derived from the values of the variables which are used in the matching 
process. The conditional probability is estimated by a discrete choice model. 
Taking the complete information sample as reference and posterior probability 
as instrument, a second subset of observations with the same size as the reduced sample 
(20,032 workers) is created. The new sub-sample (known as Bayesian approach sample) 
includes comparison workers who show the highest posterior probability values. 
The variables available in both two databases covers sociodemographics (birth 
date, gender, education level and nationality), labour market information (occupation of 
the worker following the main groups of the National Classification of Occupations and 
annual wage) and information related to the firm (responsibility charges and seniority of 
the worker in the firm, and region). As Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan (1993) suggest, 
information on firms constitute an important factor in the analysis of job transitions on 
earnings. 
Tables 1 and 2 include selected descriptive statistics for several samples by 
gender. Both tables show differences on average between outplacement and comparison 
groups (second and third column, respectively) for the complete information sample, 
constituted by 152,604 workers (404 individuals belong to the treatment group).  
  The average results of the matched control group by sample reduction present 
better values than the comparison group. Age and nationality show similar figures in 
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Variables Total Outplacement Comparison Matched control Matched control
Birth year 1,964 1,962 1,964 1,962 1,966
(11.01) (8.21) (11.01) (10.66) (9.51)
Spaniard 96.60 98.11 96.60 99.28 100.00
EDUCATION
No Education 1.46 0.00 1.46 0.00 0.02
Pre - Primary Education 28.46 5.30 28.53 20.50 29.16
Primary Education 0.85 9.47 0.82 0.97 1.89
Initial and Intermediate Vocational Training 30.36 4.92 30.43 26.07 19.81
Secondary Education 9.23 7.96 9.23 11.43 9.78
Advanced Vocational Training 14.47 7.20 14.49 19.35 14.32
Intermediate Degree - University Education 6.02 13.26 6.01 7.84 6.16
Superior Degree - University Education 8.84 42.80 8.75 13.40 18.68
Master and Doctorate 0.31 9.09 0.28 0.44 0.18
RESIDENCE - REGION
Andalusia 7.87 0.00 7.89 0.00 0.04
Aragon 3.83 11.36 3.81 7.08 0.00
Catalonia 12.39 73.86 12.22 36.40 59.77
Valencian Community 7.90 0.38 7.92 17.94 0.00
Galicia 4.53 0.00 4.54 0.00 0.00
Madrid 9.75 12.88 9.74 28.06 9.62
Basque Country 4.90 1.52 4.91 10.51 0.00
PROFESSIONAL STATUS IN LAST JOB
Managers 2.96 28.41 2.89 5.11 1.98
Professionals 8.47 24.24 8.43 10.07 11.02
Technicians and Associated Professionals 13.35 29.55 13.31 21.91 21.18
Clerks 7.32 2.65 7.33 9.47 12.31
Service, craft and related trades workers, 
operators and assemblers
56.59 6.06 56.73 49.34 31.42
Elementary occupations 11.08 9.09 11.09 4.08 22.09
JOB CHARACTERISTICS
Responsibility charges in the job  28.72 40.15 28.68 38.26 7.22
Seniority in the firm (in years) 8.51 8.90 8.51 12.88 7.54
(9.84) (7.80) (9.84) (11.17) (8.75)
EMPLOYMENT QUALITY
Annual Gross Wage (in euros) 19,690.17 46,081.64 19,621.01 29,635.15 20,192.98
(15,395.63) (32,825.68) (15,264.20) (21,954.64) (13,906.93)
Permanent contract 73.83 100.00 73.76 100.00 77.31
Number of observations 97,581 264 97,317 13,809 13,809  
 
Notes: The table reports averages and percentages for the indicated group. Standard deviations are in 
parenthesis where appropriate. Professional status in the last job follows the National Classification of 
Occupations (CNO-94).  
 
 
both samples. Women are underrepresented in the matched control groups, according to 
the outplacement group. Average education level and region of residence approaches 
figures of the outplacement group but the differences are still significant, especially for 
university education and Catalonia. The convergence is also incomplete for the 
professional status and annual wages. The dissimilarity on responsibility charges 
becomes smaller and it increases slightly for firm’s seniority. The Bayesian approach 
shows figures of education level and residence which are nearest to the outplacement 
group, but they are worse in terms of professional status, responsibility charges and 
  13employment quality. These comments are common regardless of gender, although 
matched controlled women show slightly better average figures. 
 
TABLE 2:  





Variables Total Outplacement Comparison Matched control Matched control
Birth year 1,966 1,966 1,966 1,965 1,966
(10.26) (7.32) (10.27) (9.55) (9.24)
Spaniard 97.57 93.57 97.58 98.80 100.00
EDUCATION
No Education 1.21 0.00 1.22 0.00 0.00
Pre - Primary Education 21.15 15.00 21.16 17.42 25.74
Primary Education 0.70 10.72 0.67 0.74 1.25
Initial and Intermediate Vocational Training 25.22 5.72 25.27 23.96 13.76
Secondary Education 10.68 18.57 10.65 15.38 9.64
Advanced Vocational Training 16.34 13.57 16.35 16.20 15.78
Intermediate Degree - University Education 12.07 7.14 12.09 7.65 9.18
Superior Degree - University Education 12.32 22.14 12.30 18.17 24.65
Master and Doctorate 0.31 7.14 0.29 0.48 0.00
RESIDENCE - REGION
Andalusia 6.77 0.00 6.79 0.00 0.00
Aragon 3.26 14.29 3.23 4.51 0.00
Catalonia 14.73 68.57 14.60 39.31 79.74
Valencian Community 7.17 0.71 7.18 15.49 0.00
Galicia 4.86 0.00 4.88 0.00 0.00
Madrid 12.62 16.43 12.61 35.90 8.10
Basque Country 4.21 0.00 4.22 4.79 0.00
PROFESSIONAL STATUS IN LAST JOB
Managers 0.96 4.29 0.95 1.90 0.64
Professionals 14.94 10 14.96 9.25 10.70
Technicians and Associated Professionals 14.00 19.29 13.98 28.59 24.94
Clerks 17.65 45.71 17.58 19.04 25.99
Service, craft and related trades workers, 
operators and assemblers
33.03 2.14 33.11 33.31 15.51
Elementary occupations 19.38 18.57 19.38 7.91 22.22
JOB CHARACTERISTICS
Responsibility charges in the job  20.59 9.29 20.62 25.28 1.96
Seniority in the firm (in years) 6.60 9.29 6.59 9.90 6.62
(8.23) (8.38) (8.23) (10.05) (8.08)
EMPLOYMENT QUALITY
Annual Gross Wage (in euros) 13,511.71 21,080.59 13,492.40 20,812.35 14,518.35
(10,053.03) (12,974.39) (10,037.35) (13,224.58) (9,767.29)
Permanent contract 71.40 100.00 71.33 100.00 77.94
Number of observations 55,023 140 54,883 6,223 6,223  
 
Notes: The table reports averages and percentages for the indicated group. Standard deviations are in 
parenthesis where appropriate. Professional status in the last job follows the National Classification of 
Occupations (CNO-94).  
 
 
With respect to the types of outplacement services (Table 3), the workers who 
receive individual outplacement are usually men, aged near fifty, highly educated and 
belong to high level professionals, with responsibility charges in the firm. The workers 
who have participated in group outplacement programmes are also men and on average 
five years younger. Education level is lower and their profession is usually related to the 
  14medium-low level of firms’ structure. These results are similar to those presented by the 
reviews made by the outplacement firms. 
 
TABLE 3:  
Descriptive statistics for individual and group outplacement 
 
OUTPLACEMENT INDIVIDUAL GROUP INDIVIDUAL GROUP
Birth year 1,959 1,964 1,965 1,966
(7.55) (8.19) (7.33) (7.32)
Spaniard 97.14 99.19 83.87 96.33
EDUCATION
No Education 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pre - Primary Education 1.43 9.68 0.00 19.27
Primary Education 4.29 15.32 12.90 10.09
Initial and Intermediate Vocational Training 5.00 4.84 3.22 6.42
Secondary Education 7.86 8.07 9.68 21.10
Advanced Vocational Training 5.00 9.68 16.13 12.85
Intermediate Degree - University Education 13.57 12.90 9.68 6.42
Superior Degree - University Education 49.28 35.48 25.81 21.10
Master and Doctorate 13.57 4.03 22.58 2.75
RESIDENCE - REGION
Andalusia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Aragon 2.86 20.97 0.00 18.35
Catalonia 75.71 71.77 61.29 70.64
Valencian Community 0.71 0.00 3.23 0.00
Galicia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Madrid 17.86 7.26 35.48 11.01
Basque Country 2.86 0.00 0.00 0.00
PROFESSIONAL STATUS IN LAST JOB
Managers 44.29 10.48 9.68 2.75
Professionals 26.43 21.78 19.35 7.34
Technicians and Associated Professionals 24.28 35.48 19.36 19.27
Clerks 1.43 4.03 51.61 44.04
Service, craft and related trades workers, 
operators and assemblers
2.14 10.49 0.00 2.75
Elementary occupations 1.43 17.74 0.00 23.85
JOB CHARACTERISTICS
Responsibility charges in the job  56.43 21.77 16.13 7.34
Seniority in the firm (in years) 8.70 9.13 9.04 9.36
(7.73) (7.90) (7.97) (8.53)
EMPLOYMENT QUALITY
Annual Gross Wage (in euros) 59,070.21 30,527.36 29,339.56 18,731.70
(36,118.84) (19,750.20) (18,338.89) (9,903.78)
Permanent contract 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00




Notes: The table reports averages and percentages for the indicated group. Standard deviations are in 
parenthesis where appropriate. Professional status in the last job follows the National Classification of 
Occupations (CNO-94).  
4.  Methodology 
The theoretical approach is based on the terminology of Heckman, Lalonde and 
Smith (1999) about Roy and Rubin model. Workers belong to one of two mutually 
excluding states at the same time, “1” denotes the treatment state and “0” denotes the 
  15non-treatment state. In the paper, the treatment group is constituted by those workers 
receiving outplacement service; the comparison group is represented by the WSS. Let Y 
be the outcome variable (i.e., the annual worker’s wage), so   is the value of the 
outcome variable for the individual i at time t if the worker has received the treatment, 
and   in the case of non-treatment. The impact for individual i at period t of the 
measure is  . However, this difference is unknown because these two terms 
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where Di is a dummy variable equals to one if the individual i receives the treatment and 
zero otherwise. This difficulty is known as the Fundamental Evaluation Problem. The 
solution depends on the available databases. In this case, the alternative consists of 
using non-parametric matching methods and multiple assumptions that allow 
identifying and estimating the effect of outplacement services. Lechner (2000) 
comments the advantages of the non-parametric matching methods versus other 
parametric and non-parametric methods. With respect to the first group, matching 
methods are robust to functional forms of the conditional means, so the individual 
causal effect is free of restrictions, as well as the unobserved heterogeneity of the 
population. Comparing to other non-parametric methods, matching methods are easy to 
use and intuitive. 
The aim is to determine the average treatment effect on the outcome variable Y. 
The value of the outcome variable for individual i is assumed to be independent of the 
rest of individuals and the assignment mechanism to the treatment. If there exist 
interactions among individuals or idiosyncratic effects, the changes of the outcome 
variable could be motivated by the treatment, the influence of other individual or other 
external effects. This condition devised by Rubin (1980), is known as stable unit 
treatment value assumption.  
One of the most important parameters of interest is the average treatment effect 
on the treated (ATT). This effect determines the average treatment value of the 
treatment group in the hypothetical case that the control group had also received the 
treatment: 
( ) ( ) 1 1 0 1 = − = D Y E D Y E  
  16Notwithstanding, the second term is unobserved. An alternative to overcome the 
problem is the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA). CIA settles down that the 
assignment to the treatment or control group is independent of the potential values of 
the outcome variable, conditioning for the observed characteristics (X): 
X D Y Y ⊥ 0 1,  
CIA is satisfied if the outcome variable and the variables having influence over 
the selection process are used in the matching process. Lechner (2000) shows 
empirically the importance of a database with enough information in order to satisfy this 
property. The sensibility of the results to lack of information is high. Frölich (2004) 
demonstrates that including the variables affecting the treatment choice or the outcome 
variable as well as those influencing to both factors is necessary to achieve consistent 
estimates. Considering the CIA then,  
() ( ) X D Y E X D Y E , 0 , 1 0 0 = = =  
Selection bias prevents the equality, since there would be some unobserved 
reason to justify the membership to the treatment group. The alternative to this bias is 
the use of matching techniques among elements of each group. Workers may be 
assumed to be similar enough to minimize the unobserved characteristics, although the 
condition is restrictive. A more suitable option is to accept that available characteristics 
are enough to capture unobserved information, at least partially. 
Given the previous conditions, the treatment effect is defined as the difference of 
two observed terms: 
() ( ) X D Y E X D Y E , 0 , 1 0 1 = − =  
The value of the outcome variable for individual i is assumed to be independent 
of the rest of individuals and the assignment mechanism to the treatment. If there are 
interactions among individuals or idiosyncratic effects, the changes of the outcome 
variable could be motivated by the treatment, the influence of other individual or 
external effects. In a similar setting, treatment participation is also assumed to be not 
affecting the outcome of non-participants. The fraction of treated workers on the total 
reference population is very small (see Table 3), so the assumptions are more plausible 
in this case.  
  17The matching method requires an object which allows comparison among 
characteristics of the individuals and a selection criterion. The object used is the 
propensity score: 
() ( ) ( ) X D E X D X P = = = 1 Pr  
The choice of the probit or logit model as discrete choice model to estimate the 
propensity score is not a crucial question in this case of binary treatment, as Caliendo 
and Koepinig (2005) point out. Considering several conditions
1, the average treatment 
effect is equal to the difference: 
( ) [] ( ) [ ] X P D Y E X P D Y E , 0 , 1 0 1 = − =  
With respect to the selection criterion, let define C(i) as the set of control units 
matched to the treated element i. The matching method incorporated to the paper is the 
Kernel method. This method qualifies the trade-off between matching quality and 
quantity in the estimates.  
The Kernel method considers the matching of each treated unit with a weighted 
mean of the control units. This weight is inversely proportional to the distance of the 
propensity score. Taking into account the Kernel method, the parameter of interest (τ
K) 
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where G(⋅) is the kernel Gaussian function N
1 is the number of treated workers 
and hn is a bandwidth parameter. The standard errors are derived using bootstrapping. 
Robustness remarks 
Before the presentation of the estimates, several comments are required to justify 
their validity. The comparison group might include workers who went through an 
outplacement experience in the unemployment period prior to the actual job. If the 
outcome is affected by an outplacement experience in previous period, the analysis 
would just generate more conservative estimates of the effect of the outplacement 
                                                 
1 For further details about the propensity score, see Arellano (2007) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). 
  18services. Although there is not any way of identifying workers in both samples, the 
(relative) small sample of treated individuals mitigates the potential comparison of the 
same worker in both samples and problems in identification of the treatment effect. 
If the firms fire employees on a non-random basis, the estimates can be affected 
by endogeneity bias. Taking into account the arguments of Ruhm (1994) about 
displacement, the pre-notifications in plant closings are provided on a more random 
basis than in partial layoffs. The reasons of losing the prior job for the workers included 
in the Creade database are multiple: (plant) closings, reorganizations, merges, takeovers 
and relationship problems. The most common options in the sample are related to the 
first two options, which represent near 21% and 68% of the total number of workers, 
respectively. This information can provide a “natural” experiment to test the importance 
of endogeneity
2. 
One of the advantages of this type of ALMP is the limited influence of the 
locking-in effect, due to the trade-off in terms of time between the realization of the 
ALMP and job search. In the outplacement activities, several parts of the services, such 
as elaboration of curriculum vitae and job interview training, are common in the job 
search process for both treated and non-treated workers, so the potential bias affecting 
earnings will be negligible. 
The annual earnings of the outplacement group are expressed in euros and 
deflated by the 2002 Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices, in which expenses from 
visiting foreigners must be included as well as those that residents in group households 
incur and exclude the costs made by Spaniards outside the country (INE). The wages in 
the Creade database are converted into euros (166.386 pesetas = 1€) and deflated by the 
2002 consumer price index. 
With respect to the source of information on earnings, the worker in the Creade 
database answered the question by him- or herself, and this may influence the accuracy 
of the response, and because the likelihood of self-response may differ systematically 
across groups of population, this is a potentially important omission. 
I cannot control for the pre-displacement earning losses (Jacobson et al., 1993). 
However, one of the most important characteristics of the labour market in Spain has 
                                                 
2 Other subsamples used by Ruhm (1994) to test endogeneity are the existence of highly unionized 
industries and differences among states in employment regulations. However, there is no evidence and 
information confirming that unionized industries use more frequently outplacement services. Moreover, 
there are not differences in employment regulations affecting outplacement services among regions in 
Spain. 
  19been the downward nominal wage rigidity (Holden and Wulfsberg, 2007), so this effect 
should be minimized in this case. 
Neal (1995) points out the importance of industry-specific human capital in job 
searching and future earnings. The existence of industry wage premiums may represent 
labour market rents affecting the outcome variable. Unemployed workers who find a 
new job in their pre-displacement industry get higher returns that those who switch 
industries after displacement. Moreover, the wage losses may be greater for experienced 
workers and their cost of obtaining a new job is higher. Although I cannot distinguish 
which part of the earnings corresponds to these characteristics and the detailed industry 
code, information on characteristics of the occupation and firm seniority (at least 
partially) this effect. 
Gibbons and Katz (1991) points out that firms firstly lay off workers who are 
less productive. Based on this idea, Neal (1995) analyses only displaced workers who 
are laid off in establishment closings, because the displacement does not depend on 
worker’s characteristics.  
Eliason and Storrie (2006) emphasize the importance of identifying early and 
late leavers in a final shutdown. They consider that closure process requires a huge 
amount of time and two options can prevail: workers with high initiative and good 
outside options will abandon earlier the firm but the firm will try to discard those less 
valuable employees in a first step of the closure process. I do not have information on 
these topics because the workers who leave the firm before the outplacement process 
are not in the Creade database. The sample of Creade constitutes a non-random set of 
workers affected during the displacement process, but I consider that the problem Pfann 
and Hamermesh (2001) argue does not have special relevance in this paper. Moreover, 
analysing the descriptive statistics, this result does not seem to be confirmed. 
The outplacement services can prevent or mitigates the larger proportion of 
displaced workers with low tenure who may be hired by new businesses which are more 
likely to shut down (Eliason and Storrie, 2006). The use of firm tenure and worker’s 
labour market history also reduce the effect of the bias. Neal (1995) considers that the 
displaced worker may suffer higher earning losses if the individual finds a job very 
different from the previous one, due to the existence of general, and firm and industry-
specific skills associated to seniority. Although the complete information on labour 
market transition is not available in the WSS, I have data of firm seniority to control this 
effect in both samples partially. 
  205.  Results 
Only variables that are not affected by outplacement process are included in the 
estimation process. Variables fixed over time and those determined before the 
application of outplacement services satisfy this condition. The use of two different 
sources of data can prevent the validity of assumptions in the matching process because 
the quality of information in data is seriously jeopardized, as Heckman, Lalonde and 
Smith (1999) notice. Furthermore, the differences in descriptive statistics and potential 
problems of endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity due to gender and type of 
outplacement service support the idea of evaluating these groups separately.  
Men and women do not necessarily behave in the same way when faced with 
unemployment. As shown by data from the INE and the National Public Employment 
Service (INEM) on the Spanish labour market in 2001, the female unemployment rate 
remained around twenty percent and accounted for nearly sixty percent of total 
unemployment, while the male unemployment rate was below ten percent.  
Along with outplacement status, distinction by type of service is also done in the 
estimation process. Individual and group outplacement services focus on specific target 
groups (Table 3). The sample size argument prevents a more specific classification of 
the outplacement programmes in the estimation process. 
Moreover, the use of different sub-samples allows the comparison and analysis 
of multiple estimates. Given the comments of the previous section, several set of 
estimates are elaborated depending on the final sample, the complete information 
sample, the reduction by personal characteristics and the generation of a sub-sample by 
the Bayes’ theorem. 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 present the estimates of the average increase of the annual 
wage (in euros) of the outplacement group compared to the comparison group for each 
sample. These tables present the following structure: The first and second rows show 
the ATT estimate and the corresponding standard error. The third and fourth rows 
include the number of observations in the treatment and control groups used in the 
estimation process, respectively. The last row incorporates information about the 
balancing property (BP). The columns represent the type of outplacement process 
analysed. 
As Arellano (2007) emphasizes, the BP is required to accept consistency of the 
estimates. Only the first moment condition of the property is analyzed in the paper, so  
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this weaker version is necessary but not sufficient. As commented above, the BP is 
required to validate the estimates, so those which do not satisfy the condition only 
constitute a reference for the rest. The more homogeneous the sample is, the easier it 
proves to fulfil the BP. In several cases, the elimination of one particular binary variable 
helps meet the BP (only if the variable is not statistically significant).  
The estimates confirm the positive effect of outplacement services on earnings 
of unemployed workers. Table 4 shows the ATT estimates by gender and outplacement 
type in the complete information sample. The estimated increase of the average annual 
wage compared to the control group in the complete information sample seems to be 
around 20,000 euros. However, the result is not valid because the BP is not satisfied. 
Considering each type of outplacement separately, the assumption is satisfied. The 
effect of individual and group outplacement is positive and four times higher for the 
former type (near 33,500 euros versus 8,400 euros in the group outplacement). 
The qualitative differences among outplacement types are repeated in the case of 
men and women. The magnitude of the effect is higher for men, who double the result 
of the group outplacement (12,000 euros versus 5,600 euros) and triple in the case of 
individual outplacement (36,500 euros versus 10,300 euros)
3.  
The sample reduction using similar characteristics to the outplacement group 
(Table 5) produces also positive but modest results. The general conclusions among 
outplacement types and gender keep constant, but the best result does not surpass the 
worst figures in Table 4. The increase for individual outplacement is at most significant 
when gender is not considered. The effect is negligible in the case of group 
outplacement, positive for men and negative for women. 
The estimates using the sample created by the Bayesian approach appear in 
Table 6. The main conclusions are confirmed and the results show higher and more 
significant values than Table 5, although the BP is not satisfied in more cases. The 




                                                 
3 With respect to the individual outplacement for women, comments are seriously affected by the small 
size of the group, which endangers the robustness of the results. 
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TABLE 4:  
ATT estimates for the complete sample by gender and outplacement service 
Outplacement status Individual  Group
ATT 18,730.469*** 33,477.961*** 8,371.041***
(1,420.697) (2,991.764) (1,112.149)
Control group 152,200 152,200 152,200
Treatment group 404 171 233
Balancing property NO YES - 0.001 YES - 0.001
ONLY MEN Outplacement status Individual  Group
ATT 22,614.285*** 36,462.902*** 11,852.195***
(2,251.342) (2,984.274) (1,779.948)
Control group 97,317 97,317 97,317
Treatment group 264 140 124
Balancing property NO YES - 0.001 YES - 0.001
ONLY WOMEN Outplacement status Individual  Group
ATT 5,459.028*** 10,255.861** 5,584.870***
(1,507.272) (4,091.405) (1,275.376)
Control group 54,883 54,883 54,883
Treatment group 140 31 109






Notes: * Significant at 10%,  ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1%, standard errors in 
parenthesis. The last row indicates whether the weak version of the BP is satisfied or not. For affirmative 
responses, significance level of the test is also included. The usual value is 0.01, otherwise the value is 
presented. The symbol * in this row represents the number of non-significant binary variables dropped in 




 ATT estimates for the reduced sample by gender and outplacement service 
 
Outplacement status Individual  Group
ATT 6,451.993*** 14,649.649*** -300.845
(1,738.224) (2,674.401) (1,229.104)
Control group 20,032 20,032 20,032
Treatment group 404 171 233
Balancing property YES - 0.001 YES** - 0.001 NO
ONLY MEN Outplacement status Individual  Group
ATT 8,038.827*** 15,178.789*** 2,584.288
(2,097.637) (3,663.469) (1,813.570)
Control group 13,809 13,809 13,809
Treatment group 264 140 124
Balancing property YES - 0.001 NO YES***
ONLY WOMEN Outplacement status Individual  Group
ATT -509.673 115.959 -939.653
(1,849.502) (4,735.738) (1,152.485)
Control group 6,223 6,223 6,223
Treatment group 140 31 109






Notes: * Significant at 10%,  ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1%, standard errors in 
parenthesis. The last row indicates whether the weak version of the BP is satisfied or not. For affirmative 
responses, significance level of the test is also included. The usual value is 0.01, otherwise the value is 
presented. The symbol * in this row represents the number of non-significant binary variables dropped in 
the estimation process to accept the BP. Further information is available upon request 
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 ATT estimates for the Bayesian  
approach sample by gender and outplacement service 
 
Outplacement status Individual  Group
ATT 13,048.218*** 26,202.279*** 7,151.188***
(1,287.594) (2,811.272) (1,098.465)
Control group 20,032 20,032 20,032
Treatment group 404 171 233
Balancing property NO NO NO
ONLY MEN Outplacement status Individual  Group
ATT 16,840.264*** 23,222.123*** 10,770.252***
(1,768.835) (3,434.603) (1,685.740)
Control group 13,809 13,809 13,809
Treatment group 264 140 124
Balancing property NO YES - 0.001 YES - 0.001
ONLY WOMEN Outplacement status Individual  Group
ATT 5,980.977*** 12,551.042*** 4,632.137***
(971.698) (3,188.688) (919.770)
Control group 6,223 6,223 6,223
Treatment group 140 31 109






Notes: * Significant at 10%,  ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1%, standard errors in 
parenthesis. The last row indicates whether the weak version of the BP is satisfied or not. For affirmative 
responses, significance level of the test is also included. The usual value is 0.01, otherwise the value is 
presented. The symbol * in this row represents the number of non-significant binary variables dropped in 
the estimation process to accept the BP. Further information is available upon request. 
 
 
The estimates supplement the arguments Arellano (2007) suggests about the 
existence of the reservation wage effect in outplacement services: men are more 
demanding to find a job and they increase their unemployment spell to get better labour 
market conditions, as they seem to achieve in terms of earnings. In the case of women, 
this conclusion also holds but magnitudes are smaller in both outcome variables. The 
unemployment spell is slightly higher or even decreases, but women get new jobs which 
do not represent a chance to increase the prior earnings. 
6.  Conclusions 
The Lisbon European Council in 2000 established the objective to convert the 
EU in the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy, capable of a 
sustainable economic growth with more and better job and higher social cohesion in the 
following ten years.  
 
  24In order to achieve this objective, the EU fostered social and labour market 
policies to promote quality of work, one of the most important instruments in the 
modernization process of the European social model to face up to the challenge of 
globalization and the technological, social and demographic movements. Among these 
measures, the outplacement services represent an interesting instrument whose 
importance is growing in job transitions. 
To develop this detail picture, I create an unusual data set by merging records of 
earnings of workers from the 2002 Wage Structure Survey (WSS), created by the 
National Statistical Office (INE) with workers who participated in outplacement 
services provided by the firm Creade, one of the most important professional services 
organizations in Spain. 
The scope of the paper focuses on the short-run effects of outplacement on 
earning prospects. Given the nature of these services, outplacement firms face up to the 
trade-off between finding high-quality matches and quickly finding new jobs, as occurs 
with employment services. It is not possible to assure that outplacement services can 
deal with the lasting and latent scars in the long-run established by Eliason and Storrie 
(2006). 
My findings bear on the importance of several alternative theories of the 
outplacement services. First, outplacement services should not be used as a panacea for 
any potential unemployment situation, because positive and high results are not 
guaranteed. Second, the reservation wage effect generated is compatible with the results 
Arellano (2007) present about the effect of outplacement on unemployment spell: the 
outplacement services increase unemployment duration in order to get a job with higher 
wages. This relationship is more intensive in men. Third, these conclusions are not 
against research related with post-displacement earning losses, but the paper confirms 
that the lack of information on outplacement processes in these studies may generate 
important biases, underestimating the consequences of job losses in terms of earnings. 
The service cost depends on type, complexity and duration, albeit the mean rate 
is around fifteen percent of the worker's gross wage for programmes with unlimited 
duration (De Ramos and Hernández, 2000). In order to get a conclusion in terms of 
cost-benefit analysis, the difference between the results obtained and the cost paid by 
the firm represents the benchmark in this process. 
Finally, Eliason and Storrie (2006) consider that age is an important argument in 
the displacement process, because older workers have more firm-specific capital, longer  
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tenure and less recent formal education than younger workers, so the former group is 
less valuable for new employers. Moreover, personal and familiar reasons make this 
group to be more reluctant to job changes. Although these personal characteristics are 
included in the estimation, a specific analysis of these employees will be extended in 
future studies. 
Other important point for future research is the decomposition of wages in 
different levels of seniority that Neal (1995) points out and how outplacement can take 
into account in the re-employment process to reduce earning losses. Moreover, there is a 
need for more research on this topic in other countries, especially in the EU whose 
members show a wide range of institutions to compare the results. 
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